Abstract. We examine the optimal tax and education policy in the case of a dual income tax. Incorporating an educational sector and endogenous capital taxation, we show that the results in Nielsen and Srensen's study are vulnerable with respect to assumptions on the elasticity of unskilled labor supply. Tax progressivity results residually, whereas educational policy guarantees an optimal tax wedge on, but not necessarily efficiency in, educational investment. The less elastic are the unobservable educational investment and skilled labor (the latter relative to unskilled labor supply), and the more educational policy cares about the skilled labor supply, the more progressive the tax system will be. Education will be subsidized on a net basis if the complementarity effect on the skilled labor supply is strong and important; however, there is also an offsetting substitutability effect of the unskilled labor supply at play.
INTRODUCTION
Is a dual income tax (DIT) system, such as the Nordic countries have, optimal? Should public education systems be financed by (ex ante) tuition fees or (ex post) by tax revenue and progressive taxation? These two questions have recently gained more and more attention, but might appear to be independent at first glance. However, as it will turn out later, the two questions are highly related, if one focuses on optimal tax and education policies.
In the last 20 years there have been various major tax reforms in Europe. In the early 1990s, the Nordic countries introduced a DIT, which regards labor income and capital income as two separated tax bases. Meanwhile, most highest bracket above 720,000 NOK. The German marginal tax rate on labor income starts at 14% and reaches 42% at about h55,000. In the United Kingdom the standard tax rate is 22% and increases to 40% above d35,000. The US labor tax is instead flatter, with 15% till 25% in the relevant range of income (28% above US$77,000).
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Are tuition fees in any case the best way to let students participate in their higher-education costs, as often argued by politicians and in the media? Jacobs and Bovenberg (2005) examine a redistributive model, which contains a rich set of tax instruments. In case there are both verifiable investment in human capital (e.g., time spent at university) that is tax-deductible and subsidizable, and non-verifiable inputs into education (e.g., books, computers), the optimal tax rate on capital income is positive in order to alleviate labor-tax-induced distortions in human-capital accumulation and non-verifiable inputs. Whether verifiable inputs should be subsidized or taxed by tuition fees moreover depends on the substitution elasticity in the human-capital production function. However, these authors restrict their analysis to a linear labor tax and consequently leave the linkage between progressive (labor) taxation and tuition fees or education subsidies a pending, open question. 3 In view of the preceding, several questions emerge, which this paper is going to tackle. First, regarding the policy debate, is it optimal to stick to tax progressivity in a Nordic-type DIT? Should tuition fees be introduced, and how do they interact with optimal tax policy? Is there room for subsidizing or taxing education on a net basis? Second, with respect to a theoretical perspective, are the results in Nielsen and Srensen (1997) driven by the absence of an education sector and by exogenous capital taxation? What are the effects on the labor tax structure if capital taxation is endogenized and if there is elastic leisure demand? Third, can the basic Siamese-twins mechanism in educational economics and public finance be highlighted in a purely efficiency-based model? This mechanism of subsidizing education in order to alleviate distortions in (the composition of ) learning and in order to reduce negative incentive effects of labor taxation -thereby allowing for more redistribution -is brought forward in Bovenberg and Jacobs (2005) and Jacobs and Bovenberg (2005) under some restrictive assumptions. What happens if their setting is extended to endogenous unskilled labor supply and more general production technologies and preference structures? Should educational investment be efficient in the absence of redistributional concerns?
In order to address these issues, we extend Nielsen and Srensen's model to an educational sector with both verifiable and non-verifiable inputs in human-capital formation. Thereby, we focus on elastic leisure demand and 2. The top peak of 35% is reached only at incomes above US$350,000. 3. Under uncertainty, this topic has recently been tackled using the New Dynamic Public Finance approach (see, e.g., Anderberg, 2009; Grochulski and Piskorski, 2007) . Moreover, a referee brought to the author's attention that a fully revised version of Jacobs and Bovenberg (2005) is now forthcoming. In Jacobs and Bovenberg (2009) , they take into account nonlinear taxation, but their main results and their main intuition do not change.
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r 2010 The Author German Economic Review r 2010 Verein für Socialpolitik endogenize the capital tax rate. We show that, first, combining tax progressivity and tuition fees depends on a tradeoff of various margins and on a complex constellation of different elasticities. Several policy combinations can be optimal. As a rule of thumb, progressive taxation and education subsidies are the more likely the less elastic skilled labor supply is compared to unskilled labor, the less elastic and the less important unobservable investments into education are, and the more the complementarity effect of education on skilled labor is exploited by educational policy. However, tax progressivity results residually, while tuition fees ensure an optimal tax wedge on education. Thus, second, most of the results by Nielsen and Srensen (1997) carry over, but they are vulnerable with respect to assumptions on the elasticity of the unskilled labor supply, and the reasoning changes significantly. Correcting for over-investment into education is no longer the primary driving force. Third, efficiency in educational investment is no aim per se in a general setting. Besides a revenue effect and mitigating distortions in real savings, the main aspect in taxing education is coping with labor-supply distortions. Severe distortions in skilled labor supply and strong complementarity between human capital and skilled labor work in favor of net subsidies to education. Accordingly, we confirm and highlight the linkage of tax and education policies in the Siamese-twins mechanism for a more general setting. However, we also find an offsetting substitutability effect of the unskilled labor supply on the tax wedge in education, calling for net education taxes in order to mitigate labor-supply distortions early in life. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: The next section describes the model. In Section 3, the decision problem of the government is stated. We examine the optimal tax structure and optimal educational policy in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 concludes. Appendix A contains some basic technical information.
THE MODEL
For our analysis, we start from Nielsen and Srensen's (1997) overlappinggenerations model and extend it in several respects. Still, homogeneous households live for two periods, and their mass is normalized to one.
In a small open economy, the business sector produces a homogeneous good whose price is normalized to unity. A perfectly integrated world capital market and a constant-returns-to-scale per capita production function determine the real interest rate as r and the wage per unit of effective labor as W. Hence, pretax factor prices are independent of the domestic tax system.
The representative consumer has a utility function
with positive but decreasing marginal utility (U i 40, U ii o0), where c i is consumption in period i 5 1, 2, and l i represents leisure in period i.
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In the first period, the household is provided with one unit of time, consumes a share l 1 as leisure and spends a share e ! 0 for education. The remaining time 1 À l 1 À e is supplied as unskilled labor and earns a wage rate W per unit. In the second period, the household has also one unit of time at its disposal. This unit is spent either on leisure l 2 or on working time 1 À l 2 . Working time translates into skilled labor supply, g(e, y)(1 À l 2 ), according to a concave human-capital formation function g ¼ gðe; yÞ ð 2Þ
where g(0, 0) 5 1, @gðe; yÞ=@E j > 0 and @ 2 gðe; yÞ=@ E j 2 < 0, E j 5 e, y. Thus e is the observable time investment in education, whereas y represents investment of real resources in education (e.g., books, computers), for which tax allowances cannot be justified or which cannot be observed by the government. Moreover, we assume that the two inputs are complements: @ 2 gðe; yÞ=@e@y > 0, i.e., spending more time at university is more productive if the household has more (or better) equipment available, and vice versa.
The tax system implemented is a DIT and fits the Norwegian tax system: Wage income below an exogenous threshold XW is taxed at a basic tax rate t 1 . Wage income above this level is liable to a marginal surtax rate t 2 . We assume that maximum wage income of unskilled (or raw) labor is less than the threshold (W XW), which implies that unskilled labor is entirely taxed at rate t 1 . Moreover, the effective skilled labor income in the second period is assumed to be higher than this threshold [Wg(e, y)(1 À l 2 )4XW], and a skilled worker is faced with a marginal tax rate t 2 . This can be guaranteed by assuming that the marginal productivity of the first units invested in education is high enough, in order to secure an inner solution for all e, y. Capital income is taxed at a proportional rate t.
Contrary to Nielsen and Srensen (1997) , we assume that forgone earnings are not the only private cost component of investing in human capital. There is also unobservable investment y, which can neither be (directly) taxed nor be subsidized by the government. Observable time investment e is, however, liable to a price p B per unit of e spent for education. This price is chosen by the government. p B 40 then implies a tuition fee, which has to be paid for each semester e spent at university. 4 The reasoning behind this is that, in our model, higher education can only be acquired at university, but attending university is excludable (i.e., a university is no pure public good). If the government chooses p B o0, students receive a scholarship per semester and the time input is subsidized. 4. We assume that tuition fees p B cannot be deducted from taxable income. This assumption reflects the German legislation, where neither students nor their parents can deduct such expenditures on education. 5. Bas Jacobs has pointed out to the author that the present model is very similar to the first, but unpublished, version of the Siamese-twins mechanism. Though our paper is less general in that it assumes homogeneous households, it is more general in that it uses general utility It follows from the preceding that the first-period savings s 1 of the representative household are
where we have normalized the prices of unobservable inputs y and of consumption c i to one. The second-period consumption c 2 is financed by after-tax wage income, savings and after-tax interest income. Taking into account the tax system described above, this implies
where R 5 1 þ r(1 À t). Consolidation delivers the intertemporal budget constraint
Maximizing its lifetime utility U subject to the budget constraint (5), the individual acts according to the rearranged first-order conditions
Capital taxation t distorts savings by decreasing the price of first-period consumption [equation (6)], it fosters first-period leisure demand by intertemporal substitution effects both in leisure and in consumption [equation (7)], and it subsidizes both types of educational investment by decreasing the return of alternative real capital investment [equations (9) and (10)]. Taxing unskilled and production functions; e.g., some results in Jacobs (2001, 2005) are driven by the functional form of the human-capital production function (ability bias and mitigating distortions by granting subsidies cancel each other; see Jacobs and Bovenberg, 2008) .
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labor t 1 decreases first-period labor supply [equation (7)], but subsidizes observable educational investment [equation (9)], because it decreases forgone earnings in the first period. This also distorts the composition of educational investment, because costs of unobservable investments in education are not affected by unskilled taxes. The latter holds true for tuition fees p B as well, because they depend only on observable investment. Hence, they distort both the level and the composition of human-capital investment [equations (9) and (10)]. Finally, skilled taxation distorts second-period leisure upwards [equation (8)] and decreases the return to human-capital investment; therefore, it decreases both observable and unobservable investments [equations (9) and (10)].
Combining equations (6) and (9), we obtain
Optimal allocation of consumption and time equates the rate of time preference, U 1 =U 2 À 1, and the effective return on education to the after-tax interest rate R. Equation (11) replicates the result of Nielsen and Srensen (1997) for zero tuition fees p B 5 0 and for the absence of unobservable educational investment (y 5 0). Recall that in our model tuition fees p B 40 reduce the effective marginal return on (observable) human-capital investment and that for unobservable inputs y marginal return on investment equals marginal cost R.
Optimal demands for consumption, leisure and educational investment can be written asĉ i ¼ c i ðt 1 ; t 2 ; p B ; R; XÞ,Ê j ¼ E j ðt 1 ; t 2 ; p B ; R; XÞ, E j 5 e, y and l i ¼ l i ðt 1 ; t 2 ; p B ; R; XÞ. Taking the income tax brackets as given, i.e., assuming X to be exogenous in the following government decision problem, the indirect utility function reads Vðt 1 ; t 2 ; p B ; RÞ ¼ Uðĉ 1 ;ĉ 2 ;l 1 ;l 2 Þ subject to ð5Þ ð 12Þ Then, the envelope theorem implies @V=@t 1 ¼ ÀlW½Rð1 À l 1 À eÞ þ X, @V=@t 2 ¼ ÀlW½gðe; yÞð1 À l 2 Þ À X, @V=@p B ¼ ÀlRe and @V=@R ¼ ls 1 , where l as Lagrange multiplier denotes the marginal utility of income.
GOVERNMENTAL OPTIMIZATION PROBLEM
In the following, we analyze a government decision problem, where the level of expenditure for public goods G, for example, for providing the public university sector, is kept constant, and where the threshold for the income tax bracket X is fixed. This allows us to focus on the linkage of labor taxation and different educational policies in the case of efficient taxation.
The government raises the necessary funds by setting both the tax rates on labor income, t 1 and t 2 , and the price for education (tuition fees) p B as well as Tuition Fees and the Dual Income Tax r 2010 The Author German Economic Review r 2010 Verein für Socialpolitik by implementing a capital income tax. Thereby, the government implements a Pareto-improving tax reform (see Nielsen and Srensen, 1997, p. 318f.) : the government chooses the tax rates and tuition fees in order to maximize the welfare of a representative consumer subject to the government's budget constraint. Thereby, it keeps the utility of the current old generation constant. This is equivalent to maximizing the lifetime utility of a representative agent given a consolidated, intertemporal budget constraint of the government,
where G n is the exogenous net expenditure per period.
The optimization problem is then as follows: max t 1 ;t 2 ;p B ;R Vðt 1 ; t 2 ; p B ; RÞ subject to ð13Þ ð 14Þ
Using the terms implied by the envelope theorem and denoting the Lagrange parameter of (14), which measures the marginal welfare costs of raising an additional unit of tax revenue, by m, the first-order conditions imply
The tax wedges are 
where equations (21) and (22) follow from applying the first-order conditions (9) and (10). These tax wedges D z indicate the marginal change in tax revenue when the demand for commodity z is increased by one unit. For exogenous first-and second-period leisure and in the absence of unobservable inputs into human-capital formation, differentiated labor taxes and tuition fees are equivalent instruments. With respect to observable humancapital investment, differentiated tax rates act as ex post tuition fees (subsidies), because the tax burden on skilled labor is higher (lower) than the implicit subsidy on forgone unskilled earning. In present discounted values, this effect can be reproduced by ex ante tuition fees (education subsidies).
6 Consequently, it is straightforward to show that for a given capital tax rate t40 the optimal tax wedge on education, D e , will be zero and over-investment into education can be countered either by progressive labor taxation or by tuition fees.
7 This does not contradict the findings by Nielsen and Srensen (1997) ; however, it weakens their point, because now there is a continuum of optimal tax and educational policies that yield the same optimal allocation.
However, in such a setting it is hard to see why the capital tax rate should be non-zero. Zero capital taxation would then implement a first-best solution with proportional wage taxation. The economically interesting case is therefore to analyze endogenous leisure demand with added unobservable educational investment. Both features are closer to reality, and in both cases there are insufficient instruments to compensate for distorting effects on labor supply and human-capital investment; for example, even proportional wage taxation will now render educational investment inefficient. Hence, any tax policy will prevent a first-best solution, and the resulting tradeoffs will be analyzed in the following.
In order to separate income and substitution effects, we will apply the Slutsky equations. However, the tax rates and the interest rate affect several commodity prices and will cause several substitution effects. This can be seen from restating the household's budget constraint as
6. This effect is analogous to savings allowances and interest adjustment in consumptionoriented capital taxation (see, e.g., Rose, 1999) . 7. See Schindler (2007) , an early version of this paper, for a detailed analysis and discussion of this special case. Note that, for example, the net wage for raw labor, (1 À t 1 )W, affects two commodity prices, namely, the price of education ( p e ) and the price of firstperiod leisure ðp l 1 Þ. Accordingly, the substitution effect of a change in (1 À t 1 )W can be separated into two substitution effects, one running via p e and one via p l 1 . Disentangling these effects is important when it comes to combining taxation and educational policy.
Applying the Slutsky decompositions (see Appendix A) in the first-order conditions (15) to (18), adding thereafter equations (15) and (17), and collecting terms, we obtain the following central equations:
are the shares of after-tax labor income (net of educational time investment) in the present value of the net income NI 5 
Following Diamond (1975) , we define the net social marginal value of income inclusive all income effects, viz.,
As long as there is distortive taxation, we have 1 À b40 because b is in fact the reciprocal of the marginal cost of public funds. Finally, we define the elasticities of leisure demand as e l i p j ¼ ð@l 
The equations (24)- (27) show the tradeoffs between collecting revenue and deadweight losses. The optimal taxes and fees equate the marginal benefits of allocating revenue to the public sector (1 À b) with the marginal costs, i.e., the net distortions, of collecting taxes. The optimal tax rates increase if public spending becomes more important as measured by a higher, income-shareweighted 1 À b.
The net distortions for the respective instruments are: in equation (24), induced distortions by taxing unskilled labor are the more severe the more elastic first-period leisure is ½½ðÀt 1 =ð1 À t 1 ÞÞðð1 þ rÞ=RÞo l 1 e l 1 l 1 > 0. Moreover, a higher t 1 increases distortions in savings, because it decreases first-period income, as long as ðtr=RÞe s 1 l 1 > 0. However, it has a mitigating effect on distortions in skilled labor supply and unobservable educational investment ½ðÀt 2 =ð1 À t 2 ÞÞ o l 2 e l 2 l 1 À o y e yl 1 À Á < 0 as well as on observable inputs into human-capital formation ðD E o e e el 1 < 0Þ. For taxes on skilled labor supply t 2 , net distortions increase in second-period leisure as well as in unobservable investment ½ðÀt 2 =ð1 À t 2 ÞÞ o l 2 e l 2 l 2 À o y e yl 2 À Á > 0. Skilled taxes also enforce distortions from taxing observable educational investment ðD E o e e el 2 > 0Þ, but alleviate distortions in first-period leisure ½ðÀt 1 =ð1 À t 1 ÞÞðð1 þ rÞ=RÞo l 1 e l 1 l 2 < 0 and from taxation of savings ½ðtr=RÞe s 1 l 2 < 0. Taxing observable inputs into education distorts this investment ðÀD E o e e ee > 0Þ and increases distortions both in skilled labor supply and in unobservable investment ½ðt 2 =ð1 À t 2 ÞÞ o l 2 e l 2 e À o y e ye À Á > 0. However, it alleviates distortions in unskilled labor supply ½ðt 1 =ð1 À t 1 ÞÞðð1 þ rÞ=RÞo l 1 e l 1 e > 0 and in real savings ðÀtr=RÞ½e s 1 e < 0; see equation (26) . Finally, real capital taxation distorts savings and most likely amplifies inefficiencies in first-period leisure demand, but it mitigates negative incentive effects on the second-period labor supply Tuition Fees and the Dual Income Tax r 2010 The Author German Economic Review r 2010 Verein für Socialpolitik and acts as a subsidy on both types of educational investment, i.e., it moderates distortions from skilled taxation and tuition fees [see equation (27) ].
From equation (27) the optimal capital tax rate can be displayed as
As will become clear in the following, all labor tax rates and the tax wedge on observable investment into education can be displayed as the sum of the difference between resource costs and net social marginal value of income (1 À b) and the tax wedge on consumption ðtr=RÞ -both summands multiplied with a complicated combination of various elasticities. Therefore, 1 À b can be interpreted as the revenue effect, i.e., the need for reallocating resources from the private to the public sector.
8 Applying these optimal taxation rules in equation (30), we find the optimal capital tax rate to be a function of the type
where C is a function of various elasticities and income shares, abbreviating the information contained in equations (24)- (30). If there were a lump-sum tax as additional instrument available, this would ensure b 5 1 and all expenditure could be financed efficiently without creating distortions. As there is no redistributive motive in a world with homogeneous households, we ended up with t 5 0, implying that all other tax rates and wedges are zero as well.
In the absence of a lump-sum tax, we will -except for some very special cases -have 1 À b40. Capital taxation then gains a revenue(-creating) effect and also has a mitigating effect on labor tax distortions. There are two main mechanisms working in favor of capital taxation. Firstly, following a CorlettHague type of intuition, capital should be taxed if second-period consumption is more complementary to leisure than first-period consumption is (see, e.g., Erosa and Gervais, 2002 Bovenberg, 2005, 2009 ). Nevertheless, optimal capital taxes could be zero. First, if first-period consumption is more complementary to leisure than second-period, this calls for subsidies on real capital. For some parameter constellations, it could happen then that mitigating labor-supply distortions and alleviating distortions in unobservable educational investments perfectly offset each other. Second, if there are no unobservable investments in education (i.e., if y 5 0), the Atkinson-Stiglitz theorem might be applicable. This holds if leisure is weakly separable from consumption and if -in the case of linear instruments -the preferences on consumption are homothetic. For such preferences, the revenue (or redistribution) effect and the distortion mitigation effect exactly cancel each other. For general utility functions, as in our case, this theorem fails, however, and capital will be taxed in a CorlettHague fashion (see Atkinson and Sandmo, 1980; Sandmo, 1974) .
Putting together all effects, we already know that in our setting the optimal capital tax will be non-zero in general -and should be positive if skilled labor income and unobservable investments are sufficiently high. Thus, we will use t * > 0 in the following and, except for two special cases, abstain from deriving the optimal capital tax explicitly.
9 Moreover, discussing the effects of t * < 0 would be straightforward, given the effects we are going to identify in the next section. Zero capital taxation would simplify the following optimal tax expressions, but not change the main results. The next step is now to derive optimal labor tax rates and the optimal educational policy.
OPTIMAL TAX AND EDUCATION POLICIES
We first solve the governmental optimization problem for the general case and will afterwards discuss the special cases of (i) exogenous skilled labor supply (analogous to Nielsen and Srensen, 1997) and (ii) inelastic leisure demand when young.
The general case
Solving equations (26) for the tax wedge D E on observable educational investment (net of the effect on savings) and (24) for the relative tax rate 9. This would end in an ambiguous and very complex formal expression.
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r 2010 The Author German Economic Review r 2010 Verein für Socialpolitik t 1 =ð1 À t 1 Þ on unskilled labor, and inserting the resulting expressions into equation (25), we find the optimal tax rate on skilled labor as a function of the revenue effect and the optimal capital tax rate to be equal to Z40 measures the distorting effect of skilled taxes on leisure demand in the second period ðe l 2 l 2 < 0Þ and on unobservable educational investment ðe yl 2 > 0Þ. Educational policy to foster observable inputs into human-capital formation, the last term in the first line of the expression for Z, will mitigate the aforementioned distortions (viz. decrease Z). 10 The second line, moreover, takes into account the net mitigating effect of unskilled wages on second-period labor supply and unobservable investment. The lower the unskilled wage income is, the more attractive become second-period labor and investment in education. This net effect, however, depends both on the direct effect skilled wages have on first-period leisure ðe l 1 l 2 > 0Þ and on an (offsetting) indirect channel, working via the effect of skilled taxes on educational investment e, which then affect the unskilled labor supply ðe l 1 e e el 2 < 0Þ.
11 The larger is the total distorting effect Z, i.e., the higher is Z, the lower the optimal tax rate t 2 will be.
10. All arguments with respect to the effect of elasticities, made in the following, are ceteris paribus. Actually, the elasticities are interdependent and not constant. Moreover, the optimal tax equations do not deliver explicit solutions for the optimal tax rates, because the terms on the RHS of the optimal tax expressions [e.g., equation (32) Turning to the numerator of equation (32), the optimal tax rate t 2 is increasing in the need for tax revenue (1 À b40), see the first line in (32): the larger the income share of skilled labor, viz., the higher o 2 40, the more revenue is earned by a high tax rate. The resulting low wage rate instead decreases incentives for educational investment and therefore lowers the revenue from taxing education. Hence, the second term in the expression for Z calls ceteris paribus for a decrease in skilled taxes, as this will increase educational investment (e el 2 > 0) and the tax base o e . The last term in the first line takes into account revenue from taxing unskilled labor (traded against net distortions in unskilled labor). Taxing unskilled labor gains revenue from the unskilled tax base o 1 , and it fosters educational investment, leading to increased revenue from taxing education. Accordingly, o 1 ½Ào e =ðÀe ee Þe el 1 > 0. In order to exploit these two effects, skilled taxes t 2 should be set even higher, because this fosters unskilled labor supply ðe l 1 l 2 > 0Þ. However, this mechanism is the less important the better the unskilled labor supply can be enhanced by taxing education, i.e., the larger e l 1 e =ðÀe ee Þ < 0 in absolute value. Thus, the factor e l 1 l 2 þ ðe l 1 e =ðÀe ee ÞÞe el 2 Â Ã is ambiguous in sign. The net effect on first-period leisure then affects the fund raising by taxing unskilled labor.
Equivalent effects appear for a positive capital tax t * , which will lead to a downward distortion in saving.
12 This is mitigated by a higher tax on secondperiod income, inducing more savings for consumption smoothing, as e s 1 l 2 < 0. Again, there is an offsetting effect working on savings via educational investment e ðe s 1 e > 0Þ. The more efficient the alleviation of savings distortions by taxing education is, the less necessary the taxation of skilled labor becomes ½ðe s 1 e =ðÀe ee ÞÞe el 2 > 0. Finally, in the last fraction in the numerator of the second line of equation (32), the effect of taxing unskilled labor is again taken into account. Fostering savings can be achieved by mildly taxing the unskilled labor supply, which then boosts savings for consumption smoothing ðe s 1 l 1 > 0Þ. Nevertheless this effect is the less important the better savings can be increased by taxing education ðe s 1 e e el 1 < 0Þ. Hence, the second factor in the last term is ambiguous. Analogously to the revenue effect discussed above, the net effect of skilled taxation on unskilled labor supply e l 1 l 2 þ ðe l 1 e =ðÀe ee ÞÞe el 2 Â Ã is ambiguous as well, and we cannot say much on these last factors.
Putting all together, we see that the sign of t 2 is undetermined. As long as the revenue effect and the effect of skilled wages on savings are sufficiently large and the channels working on savings s 1 and first-period leisure l 1 via educational investment e are not too strong, there will be positive taxation of second-period (skilled) income, t * 2 > 0. This should intuitively be the case. Skilled taxation then collects tax revenue and alleviates distortions in savings, 12 . If the optimal capital tax rate were negative or zero, all effects would simply be reversed in sign or canceled. Thus, we are not going to discuss those cases in more detail. The same holds true for the following discussions of the other tax instruments.
r 2010 The Author German Economic Review r 2010 Verein für Socialpolitik but it has to trade these against distortions in skilled labor and educational investment.
Turning to optimal taxation of unskilled income, we find from the reduced form of equation (24) 
where t * 2 =ð1 À t * 2 Þ represents the optimal tax expression from (32) and is assumed to be positive.
The main denominator of equation (33) reflects standard intuition. The optimal tax rate t 1 is decreasing in the distortions it creates in first-period leisure choice ðe l 1 l 1 Þ; however, these distortions are mitigated by a substitutability effect of educational investment on unskilled labor ½ðe l 1 e =ðÀe ee ÞÞe el 1 > 0. The less educational investment, the more attractive is the unskilled labor supply, because the effective gap between unskilled and skilled wages is narrowed.
The tax rate in (33) increases in the need for tax revenue, 1 À b. The larger is the income share of unskilled labor (o 1 ) and the more a decrease in unskilled wages boosts the education tax base ðo e e el 1 < 0Þ, the more revenue is earned from taxing unskilled labor. Next, mitigating distortions in savings call ceteris paribus for a lower tax rate, because a high unskilled wage will increase first-period income and with it savings, on account of consumption smoothing ðe s 1 l 1 > 0Þ. Again, there is an offsetting (indirect) effect working via educational investment: the better savings can be fostered by taxing education, the less important is the channel via unskilled earnings ðe s 1 e e el 1 < 0Þ. Last, but not least, higher taxation of unskilled (first-period) income goes with positive taxation of skilled income. An increased tax rate t 1 decreases both opportunity costs of first-period leisure, inducing intertemporal substitution effects, and costs of unobservable educational investment. Consequently, unskilled taxation works against the upward distortion in second-period leisure l 2 ðe l 2 l 1 > 0Þ and the downward distortion in y ðe yl 1 < 0Þ. Once more there is an opposing channel working via education: part of this distortion mitigation is already done by the complementarity effect of education (which directly corresponds to the Siamese-twins principle in Bovenberg and Jacobs, 2005) , and the more important this channel is, the less necessary becomes the use of unskilled taxation ½ðo l 2 e l 2 e À o y e ye Þe el 1 < 0. In a nutshell, the tax rate on unskilled labor supply is positive and increasing in the need for tax revenue and in the need for mitigating distortions in savings and skilled labor, as long as the (indirect) channels via educational investment are not dominating. On the contrary, the tax rate decreases unequivocally in the elasticity of unskilled labor supply.
Finally, by inserting the optimal tax rates t * 2 and t * 1 from (32) and (33) in equation (26), we find the optimal (reduced) tax wedge on observable educational investment,
From the denominator, we find that the tax burden on (observable) education will be the lower, the more elastic income-weighted educational investment is, and thus, the greater the excess burden due to taxation. Turning to the numerator, the need for tax revenue increases net taxation of education e the more, the larger is the income share of educational spending, o e . Optimally positive capital taxation t * increases the educational tax burden even more, because a decrease in education will increase savings in real capital ðe s 1 e > 0Þ. Additionally, there is a substitutability effect, stemming from first-period taxation and working in favor of taxing education. A higher tax rate t 1 should ceteris paribus be accompanied by higher taxation of education, because unskilled labor supply (first-period leisure) and educational investment are substitutes (complements). Taxing education makes second-period labor less attractive, induces intertemporal substitution effects in leisure and, hence, decreases distortions in unskilled labor. Consequently, there is an efficiencyenhancing substitutability effect. The last term in the numerator of (34) instead works in favor of education subsidies and is identical with the basic mechanism underlying the Siamese-twins effect: higher taxes on skilled labor require education subsidies for efficiency reasons. Fostering education will increase both second-period labor supply and unobservable investment in education (recall that we assumed e and y to be complements) by increasing opportunity costs of second-period leisure and the rate of return on investment, respectively. Consequently, education subsidies dampen the distorting effect of skilled taxation. Note that the tax wedge on education can have either sign. Consequently, in a general model, efficient educational investment cannot be optimally guaranteed -even if there are no unobservable investments. The tax wedge on human capital becomes zero if the revenue, the real savings and the substitutability effect exactly cancel the complementarity (Siamese-twins) Tuition Fees and the Dual Income Tax r 2010 The Author German Economic Review r 2010 Verein für Socialpolitik effect. Looking at equation (34) and having in mind the formulas for optimal labor taxes in (32) and (33), this seems only to be the case for strong assumptions on preferences and production technologies.
Net subsidies on education (D E o0) then require that the complementarity effect on skilled labor supply be strong and dominate the other effects. However, in either case (D E 9 0) there can prevail ex ante subsidies ( p B o0) if the residual tax progressivity is strong and if the optimal capital tax rate is low; p B o0 is then necessary to balance the overall tax burden on education.
Taking everything together, we conclude: if the government can rely on tuition fees, it gains a degree of freedom. Skilled and unskilled taxes are now determined by the tradeoffs discussed in equations (32) and (33), and tuition fees are used to adjust the optimal tax burden on observable investment in education. Hence, compared with Nielsen and Srensen (1997) , the linkage between tax progressivity and over-investment in education disappears. Progressivity or regression results residually from the efficiency considerations discussed above; human-capital investment is no longer the ( primary) driving force.
Tax progressivity is the likelier the more elastic is unskilled labor supply relative to skilled labor (i.e., the less distortionary skilled taxation is compared with unskilled taxation) and the more the complementarity effect of education on skilled labor dominates the substitutability effect on unskilled labor (i.e., the more education policy cares about distortions from skilled taxation). The resulting optimal labor tax structure is accompanied by either positive or negative tuition fees, which correct the level of educational investment. As long as labor supplies are elastic, a first best can never be reached in the absence of a poll tax, because with the present set of instruments, neither distortions in labor supply nor those in unobservable educational investment can be optimally prevented.
The Nielsen-Srensen case
The results for the general case are very complex and partly ambiguous. In order to derive more clear-cut results, we are therefore going to analyze two special cases, which simplify the analysis considerably. For the first case, assume that second-period leisure demand is inelastic and zero, l 2 5 0. Moreover, assume for the beginning an exogenously fixed capital tax rate t40. Such a setting corresponds then to the case Nielsen and Srensen (1997, Sec. 8 ) discuss in their extension.
By relying on the symmetry of substitution effects, this implies e l 2 p j ¼ e jl 2 ¼ 0 8j. As o 2 40, it follows immediately from equation (25) that b 5 1, i.e., the skilled tax now balances the net social marginal value of income and resource costs; hence, the revenue effect disappears. Note, however, that t 2 is no lump-sum tax as long as there are unobservable inputs into education (o y 40). Distortions will still prevail. The optimal tax rate on the unskilled labor supply in (33) reduces to
The measure for the distorting effect in the denominator remains unchanged, but the numerator simplifies. Distortions in savings by t40 call for subsidizing first-period income, if savings and first-period leisure are substitutes ðe s 1 l 1 > 0Þ and if the opposing effect via educational investment does not dominate. If the direct effect of first-period leisure on unobservable educational investment dominates the channel via observable inputs e, the second term increases the tax on unskilled labor supply, because a low unskilled wage boosts unobservable investment y. This effect is the stronger, the higher the tax rate t 2 necessary for ensuring b 5 1. From (34), the optimal tax wedge on observable educational inputs reads
Assuming that there are no unobservable inputs (o y 5 0), we then confirm Nielsen and Srensen's result that there should be a positive tax burden on education, given positive capital taxation. However, this no longer implies that there must be tax progressivity, because education can also be taxed by implementing tuition fees. Endogenizing capital taxation and deriving the optimal tax ratet will, amazingly, ensure tax progressivity, accompanied by direct education subsidies, if unobservable investments do not play a role. By inserting equations (35) and (36) Note that from b 5 1 it does not follow that the optimal capital tax is zero, i.e., equation (31) cannot be applied directly. The reason is that the tax rate on skilled income, t 2 , is no lump-sum tax here, because it distorts unobservable educational investment. To put it in other words, if there is an additional lump-sum tax, t 2 is optimally zero, and (31) can be applied, but that does not hold in this special case.
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Increasing the price for second-period consumption, i.e., decreasing the interest rate by levying a capital tax, subsidizes educational investment and is the more important the more unobservable investment is distorted by taxing skilled labor ½t 2 =ð1 À t 2 Þ and the more weight unobservable investments have in generating income (o y ). A positive capital tax is supported as long as the ( potentially) offsetting indirect effect, working via first-period labor, does not overcompensate the direct effect. Taxing capital as a cross-subsidy is then in line with the results in Jacobs and Bovenberg (2005) , where, however, the indirect effects via unskilled labor are missing. The positive-capital-tax result supports the entire aforementioned interpretation.
In case unobservable educational investment is inelastic ðe yp j ¼ 0 8jÞ or is zero (o y 5 0), the tax on skilled labor turns into a real lump-sum tax and there is no need for capital taxation at all. We findt ¼ 0 from (37). As unskilled labor should not be distorted, this also impliest 1 ¼ 0 from (35) as well aŝ D E ¼ 0 from (36), because it also does not pay to distort education if there are no other distortions. In view of these facts, we will reach a first best, where all revenue is financed by skilled taxation. As this ceteris paribus distorts observable educational investment, compensating direct education subsidies are required, and we find fromD E ¼ 0
In this special case, the tax progressivity result t 2 4t 1 by Nielsen and Srensen (1997) is even strengthened, because the capital tax rate is endogenized. Note that it does not, however, apply for their reduced set of instruments (i.e., neglecting tuition fees), as not distorting education would call for proportional taxation, whereas not distorting unskilled labor required progressive taxation. It is important to note as well that the reasoning for tax progressivity has changed: it is now necessary for (efficiently) generating labor tax revenue and no longer related to (over)investment in education. Hence, the Siamese-twins mechanism is active for efficiency reasons again.
The other extreme: inelastic youth leisure
The second special case to be examined is the polar opposite to Nielsen and Srensen (1997) : assume that leisure demand is inelastic when young.
Moreover, keep for the time being the assumption of exogenously positive capital taxation, t40.
Consequently, l 1 5 0, e l 1 p j ¼ e z j l 1 ¼ 0 8j, and now equation (24) 
and the optimal tax rate on skilled labor supply trades -for a given tax rate on capital -mitigating distortions in savings against (net) distortions in skilled labor and unobservable investment. For any t40, this requires positive skilled taxation if the direct effect on savings ðe s 1 l 2 < 0Þ dominates the channel via educational investment ðe s 1 e > 0Þ. The optimal tax wedge on education reduces to
and mitigating savings distortions (for given t40) call for a net tax on education, whereas mitigating tax distortions in unobservable investments y require a subsidy on complementary investment e. As usual, the tax wedge decreases in the (income-weighted) elasticity of educational investment. However, in determining the optimal capital taxation, there is, contrary to the previous polar case, no way to justify a non-zero tax rate t. Taxing unskilled labor is indeed a real lump-sum tax if tuition fees are used to offset the implicit subsidy on the price of observable investment. It is straightforward to show from equation (30) that optimallŷ
independent of the share of unobservable inputs o y . In order to avoid unnecessary distortions in skilled labor supply, we then put t 2 5 0 [see equation (40)], and the tax wedge on education disappears as well [D E 5 0 from equation (41)]. All labor taxation is done by taxing the unskilled labor supply only, and we find a regressive tax structure t 1 4t 2 5 0. However, D E 5 0 implies tuition fees
This ensures a first-best allocation, even if there are unobservable investments in education. 
Summary
Putting together all our results, we can conclude that taxes on unskilled and skilled labor are determined by trading off distortions on various margins, and that tax progressivity is determined residually and no longer an actively chosen policy instrument as soon as tuition fees are available. Whether there will be tax progressivity and education subsidies or proportional (regressive) taxation and tuition fees depends on various elasticities. However, there seems to be a clear pattern, and we conjecture:
Conjecture 1. The more elastic unskilled labor supply relative to skilled labor and the less elastic the income-weighted unobservable investment in education ðo y e yp j Þ, the more progressive the tax system will be, and the likelier direct education subsidies become.
Moreover, it becomes obvious that the basic mechanism at play in Bovenberg and Jacobs (2005) is indeed driven by efficiency reasons. Their Siamese-twins result states that higher tax rates for more redistribution require higher education subsidies to offset tax distortions in human-capital investment and labor supply. The underlying complementarity effect also shows up in our context: here, the mechanism allows for efficient collection of tax revenue, i.e., for reallocating resources between the private and the public sector.
In the Siamese-twins setting, the case for education subsidies is weakened by their adverse distributional consequences, i.e., the ability bias in education, favoring the gifted, has an offsetting effect on education subsidies (see, e.g., Jacobs and Bovenberg, 2008 ). An analogous effect shows up in our setting. There are no heterogeneous households (i.e., no distributional concern), but there is unskilled labor supply. The latter creates a competing substitutability effect on educational investment, stemming from distortions in unskilled labor. The more elastic and the more important the unskilled labor supply is, the lower education should ceteris paribus be, in order to mitigate tax distortions in the unskilled labor supply. This effect is absent in Bovenberg and Jacobs (2005) and Bovenberg (2005, 2008) , because for distributional reasons it is sufficient to focus on a model of the skilled labor supply only.
Furthermore, we find that efficiency in educational investment is not an aim per se in a general setting. Note that this result does not depend on the presence of unobservable investment, but it is amplified by it. Even with homogeneous agents, education will be distorted in order to reduce the overall excess burden -except for special cases ( preferences) in leisure demand.
A critical point in our analysis is that the tax brackets are assumed to separate skilled from unskilled labor, establishing in fact skill-specific taxes. In reality there are also high-income households who never attended university, but are liable to the high taxes. This then makes the analysis more complex 
CONCLUSIONS
We have extended the analysis by Nielsen and Srensen (1997) for an educational sector, education policy and optimal capital taxation. We showed that their results concerning labor taxation often are stable, but over-investment in education is no longer the primary driving force behind these results.
By abstracting from heterogeneous households and redistribution, we highlighted (and confirmed) some basic mechanisms in Bovenberg and Jacobs (2005) and Bovenberg (2005, 2009) and extended these to a more general setting. Efficiency in education is not a policy aim per se, but still, optimal tax and education policies are strongly linked. The optimal policy mix, including capital taxation, then depends on the elasticities of leisure and educational investments.
These results must be kept in mind, if any reform in financing the educational sector is considered. In the current debate on tuition fees in central Europe, both sides can be right: tuition fees (as in the United States) can be the best choice, but no fees at all (as in the Nordic countries) can also be optimal -all depends on the elasticity constellation. However, given that the starting point ex ante is optimal, introducing tuition fees must have an effect on the labor tax schedule. This seems not to be the case either for the central European countries or for the United Kingdom. Consequently, their latest reform steps might appear doubtful. 
APPENDIX A
A.1. Slutsky equations
